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1. Introduction
CEO compensation has long been a major focus of accounting research. Although this
research provides considerable evidence on annual bonuses and stock options, it rarely
considers benefits such as pensions. But revelations of large, poorly disclosed pensions such as
the $750 thousand monthly payment that General Electric offered its former CEO, Jack Welch,
raise important questions about the level and precision of pension disclosures and the role of
pensions in CEO contracts.
Questions such as these prompted the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to
implement significant regulatory changes in compensation disclosures, including pensions. As
of December 15, 2006, the SEC requires firms to disclose in proxy statements the annual accrual
of pension benefits and the present value of accrued pension benefits for each of a firm’s top
five executives. Although these changes increase the level of pension disclosures and the
penalties for disclosures that are false, misleading, and/or of poor quality, firms continue to
exercise discretion in the disclosure of pension benefits (Den Uyl and Frederick 2006; Scannell
and Lublin 2006).
The changes in SEC disclosure requirements are consistent with the view of some
commentators, institutional investors, and academics that pensions offer substantially greater
opportunities for managerial rent extraction than other compensation mechanisms (e.g., Colvin
2001; Bebchuk et al. 2002; Hodgson 2004). Proponents of this “Managerial Power View” make
two arguments against CEO pensions. First, limited disclosure requirements enable CEOs to
hide and/or camouflage excess pension benefits. Second, CEOs with power over their boards of
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directors extract rents through pensions because pension payments are less observable and less
sensitive to performance than other forms of long term compensation.1
An alternative view, from the economics and finance literature, is that boards of
directors represent the interests of shareholders and therefore structure contracts to meet the
CEO’s reservation wage, to minimize agency costs, and to minimize joint tax burdens (e.g., Core
et al. 2005). According to this “Optimal Contracting View,” boards substitute pensions for other
forms of compensation and incentives when pensions provide optimal incentives and/or
minimize joint tax burdens (e.g., Lazear 1979; Scholes et al. 2002; Edmans 2006). This view
implies that contracting determinants (e.g., firm‐level economic factors, tax rates, labor market
conditions) primarily determine the provision and disclosure of CEO pension benefits.
Given these conflicting views on CEO pensions, I examine the determinants of CEO
pensions and the associations between CEO pensions, disclosure choices, and excess
compensation. Specifically, I investigate the extent to which discretionary disclosures are
associated with excess pension benefits, and the relation between pensions and CEO power
and/or contracting determinants.
Using both proprietary data and public disclosures under the pre‐2007 regulations, I
examine the difference between pension valuations estimated using full information on plan
characteristics, and valuations using only public disclosures and common valuation
assumptions. I find that firm disclosures that exclude key plan characteristics lead to
downwardly biased estimates of pension benefits in some cases. But even using the pre‐2007

SEC Commissioner Roel Campos stated publicly that Professor Bebchuk’s research was “very
influential” in the drafting of the new pension disclosure regulations (Lublin and Dvorak 2007).
1
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disclosure requirements, the biases are small in the vast majority of cases, suggesting that SEC
disclosure changes are likely to have little effect on investors’ ability to value pensions.
Moreover, the evidence indicates that CEOs do not pursue disclosure policies that hide and/or
camouflage excess pension benefits.
I find that contracting variables are the primary determinants of pension benefit levels,
but find mixed support for the claim that more powerful CEOs receive higher pension benefit
levels. Even if disclosures lead to biased estimates of pension values and pension benefit levels
are higher than expected, these facts have little impact on shareholders if they do not lead to
excessive total compensation. I therefore investigate whether pensions are associated with total
excess compensation. Although economic factors are the primary determinants of pension
benefit levels, I find a positive association between pensions and excess compensation,
consistent with the Managerial Power View that pensions can be used to extract additional
rents.
Overall, my results provide some support for both the Managerial Power and Optimal
Contracting Views. Economic contracting variables, however, appear to explain the variation in
pension benefit levels to a greater extent than measures of CEO power. This suggests that
although pensions can be used for rent extraction in some cases, this practice appears to be
limited. In addition, my disclosure results suggest that rent extraction can be detected using
public disclosures.
This study makes two contributions. First, in light of recent regulatory changes, it
provides insight into the level and precision of compensation disclosures. Second, this study
contributes to the literature on agency problems and executive compensation by investigating
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the relative ability of the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Views to explain the level
and mix of pensions in CEO contracts.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides institutional
background on CEO pensions. Section 3 develops the hypotheses and Section 4 discusses the
samples and empirical measures. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes.

2. Institutional Background
Firms often grant CEOs pensions that provide life annuities of up to 60% of their final
average salary plus bonus (Sundaram and Yermack 2006). Pensions supplement other
retirement benefits (e.g., deferred compensation and defined contribution plans), but are
typically larger in monetary terms and do not require explicit ongoing contributions from
participants (Clark Consulting 2005).
Pensions come in two forms: qualified plans and non‐qualified plans. The Department
of Labor regulates qualified plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”). ERISA prohibits qualified plans from providing benefits on salaries greater than
$220,000 and dictates minimum funding levels and participation requirements. The Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”) insures qualified plans against firm bankruptcy. In
addition, qualified plans receive beneficial tax treatment: firms can fund qualified plans and
receive a current tax deduction without imposing an immediate tax liability on the participant.
Non‐qualified plans do not receive beneficial tax treatment. If a firm funds a non‐
qualified plan, the plan must be at risk of firm bankruptcy to avoid imposing an immediate tax
liability on the participant. Most non‐qualified plans are therefore unfunded. Non‐qualified
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plans are not insured by the PBGC and are not subject to ERISA maximum benefit, funding, and
participation requirements.
There are two types of non‐qualified plans: restoration plans and supplemental
executive retirement plans (“SERPs”). Restoration plans provide benefits on salaries above the
$220,000 ERISA limit using the same formula as an associated qualified plan. SERPs calculate
retirement benefits using formulas that differ from those of qualified plans.
Qualified and non‐qualified plans are not mutually exclusive. Some firms include top
executives in broad based qualified plans up to the ERISA salary limit, and then provide
additional benefits using non‐qualified plans. In this study, I examine total benefits provided to
the CEO under all plans.
Qualified plans, restoration plans, and SERPs calculate annual retirement payments as a
percentage of final average earnings for either the last three or five years of employment. Final
average earnings for qualified and restoration plans include base salary, while final average
earnings for SERPs most often include base salary and annual bonus. Plans generally calculate
the annual retirement payment as 1.5–2.5% multiplied by the service years credited. Some firms
cap payments at 50–60% of final average earnings.
CEOs typically accrue one service year per employment year. Some firms, however,
grant multiple service years to new hires or to CEOs who are leaving office (Yermack 2006). For
example, when Roy Vagelos left office as CEO, Merck granted him an additional 17 service
years with an approximate value of $7.4 million.
Non‐qualified plans are often at risk of firm bankruptcy. Non‐qualified plans are also
often at risk of rescission because boards can revoke and/or renegotiate benefits. Some firms
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protect their CEOs from these risks by using Rabbi and Secular trusts. Rabbi Trusts obligate the
firm to provide pension benefits up to the trust’s funding level. Rabbi Trusts do not protect
plans from bankruptcy and firms can therefore fund Rabbi Trusts without imposing immediate
tax liabilities on CEOs (Morse et al. 1997). Secular Trusts protect plans from the firms’ creditors.
Because Secular Trusts provide bankruptcy protection, CEOs incur immediate tax liabilities
upon funding.
Some firms allow the CEO to take a lump sum payout of the present value of accrued
pension benefits either at retirement or when leaving office in lieu of receiving the pension in
the form of a life annuity. When calculating the value of lump sum payouts, firms can use
favorable discount rates and/or mortality tables. For example, a BBB rated firm can use the 30
Year US Treasury Rate instead of its cost of debt when calculating a lump sum value. Such a
change in discount rates can increase a pension’s value by over 30%.2
For proxy statements filed prior to December 15, 2006, the SEC did not require firms to
disclose the following: the present value of accrued pension benefits, the annual accrual of
pension benefits, the annual retirement payment, lump sum payout options, Rabbi Trusts, and
Secular Trusts.
If a firm provided pension benefits based on final average earnings and service years,
the SEC required the firm’s proxy statement to include a table displaying annual retirement
payments classified by final average earnings and service years. Along with the table, firms
were required to provide a narrative explanation of the executives’ service years and how final

The example assumes retirement at age 60 in December 2003 with a life expectancy based on the Social
Security Life Expectancy Table. At that time, the ten year BBB rate was 6.20% and the 30 year US Treasury
rate was 3.25%.
2
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average earnings were calculated. It required firms to provide final average earnings only if
final average earnings differed by more than 10% from those shown in the Summary
Compensation Table. If the firm based payments on a mechanism other than service years and
final average earnings, the SEC required a narrative explanation. Appendix A provides these
disclosure requirements.
For proxy statements filed on or after December 15, 2006, the SEC requires firms to
include the annual accrual of pension benefits in the Summary Compensation Table, and to
disclose the present value of accrued pension benefits in the Retirement Plans Section. These
changes are incremental to the earlier disclosure regulations. Under the new regulations, the
SEC still does not require firms to disclose lump sum payout options or the existence of Rabbi
Trusts and Secular Trusts. Appendix B presents the new disclosure requirements.

3. Hypothesis Development
In this section I develop hypotheses to test the Managerial Power and Optimal
Contracting Views on CEO pensions. Specifically, I develop hypotheses about the discretionary
disclosure of pension benefits, the determinants of pension benefits, and the association
between pension benefits and excess compensation.
3.1. Disclosure Policies
Proponents of the Managerial Power View argue that limited disclosure requirements
enable CEOs to hide and/or camouflage excess pension benefits through discretionary
disclosure policies that lead outside observers to make downwardly biased estimates of pension
values (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Hodgson 2004; Gordon 2005). This argument does not
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imply that outside observers have irrational expectations about the level of bias in their
estimates. It does, however, imply that observers cannot identify individual CEOs who hide
and/or camouflage excess pension benefits.
Proponents of this view assume that CEOs hide and/or camouflage excess pension
benefits because pensions are scrutinized by outside observers who can constrain CEO actions.
This assumption appears valid—large institutional investors pursue proxy voting policies that
call for increased pension disclosures and limits on excessive benefit levels.3 Proponents also
assume that the behavior of these outside observers does not lead firms to fully disclose pension
benefits. Proprietary costs of disclosure can sustain a discretionary disclosure equilibrium in
which firms do not fully disclose pension benefits (Verrecchia 1983). For example, firms in
competitive industries may not disclose information about their top executives’ compensation
packages, because such disclosures would benefit competitors by providing information on
incentives and reservation wages.
A necessary condition for the argument that CEOs exploit limited disclosure
requirements to hide and/or camouflage excess pension benefits is that estimates based on
public disclosures are downwardly biased. The first hypothesis, stated in the affirmative, tests
this necessary condition.
H1A: Estimates of pension benefits based on public disclosures are downwardly
biased.

For example, TIAA‐CREF states in its Policy Statement on Corporate Governance that executive
pensions “should not be used to enhance retirement benefits beyond that which is reasonable” and that
the “discount rate used to calculate the lump‐sum value of the pension entitlement should approximate
the reinvestment rate available at retirement and should be disclosed.”
3
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Downward bias is only a necessary condition because proprietary costs of disclosure can
be the sole reason that firms pursue disclosure policies that lead outside observers to make
downwardly biased estimates. The Managerial Power View, however, implies that some CEOs
use disclosure policies to hide and/or camouflage excess pension benefits. This leads to the
second hypothesis.
H1B: Downward bias increases with excess pension benefits.
Proponents of the Managerial Power View often claim that powerful CEOs pursue
disclosure policies that make it difficult to gauge their benefit levels. The role of CEO power,
however, in the use of disclosure policies to hide and/or camouflage excess pension benefits is
not clear. Powerful CEOs have greater influence on firm policies and are therefore better able to
extract and hide excess pension benefits. But powerful CEOs could be indifferent to whether
their rent extraction is observable because outside stakeholders may be unable to constrain the
actions of powerful CEOs, implying that weak CEOs may have greater incentives to pursue
such policies.
In addition, Singh (2006) shows theoretically that in the presence of director career
concerns relatively independent boards reduce the disclosed level of CEO pay to signal
independence. I therefore state the following non‐directional hypothesis about the relation
between CEO power and pension disclosures.
H1C: CEO power is associated with pension disclosure policies.
3.2. Determinants of Pension Benefits
Proponents of the Managerial Power View argue that CEOs with power over their
boards extract rents in general. According to their argument, however, “outrage costs” arising

11
from the actions of the press, regulators, and institutional investors limit the extent to which
CEOs can extract rents through current compensation (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried 2004).
Proponents therefore postulate that powerful CEOs extract rents through pensions because
pensions are less observable to outside stakeholders and less sensitive to current performance
than other forms of compensation and incentives. Pensions are less observable because they are
subject to limited disclosure requirements. Pensions are less sensitive to current performance
because final average earnings and tenure determine total pension benefits.
Managerial Power View proponents claim that powerful CEOs either substitute
pensions for other forms of compensation and incentives at beneficial rates, or complement
other forms of compensation and incentives with pensions. In either case, according to their
argument, CEO power is the primary, but not necessarily the sole, determinant of the level and
mix of pension benefits in CEO contracts. This leads to the following hypothesis.
H2A: Pension benefits are positively associated with CEO power.4
Alternatively, and consistent with the Optimal Contracting View, economic models
indicate that pension‐like mechanisms can enter optimal contracts to address incentive
problems when the agent is difficult to monitor, and there are gains from aligning the agent’s
interests with those of creditors.
Edmans (2006) theoretically investigates whether debt enters the optimal contract in the
presence of agency costs of debt and equity. He finds that firms trade off agency costs of debt
Kalyta and Magnan (2006) investigate a similar hypothesis, but assume that public disclosures lead to
accurate estimates of pension benefits, that boards do not provide pensions for incentive purposes, and
that pensions do not substitute for other forms of compensation and incentives. I extend their results by
investigating these assumptions and by examining discretionary disclosure of pension benefits. In
addition, I use a larger sample, allowing me to increase statistical power and control for industry effects
that can be associated with governance.
4
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and equity, and that debt enters CEO contracts when there are incentives to increase firm risk to
the detriment of creditors (the “asset substitution problem”). By introducing debt into the
CEO’s contract, the firm aligns the CEO’s interests with those of creditors, and therefore
benefits from lower borrowing rates.
Pensions function as debt in CEO contracts because pensions are typically not
bankruptcy protected. Consistent with Edmans’s prediction, Sundaram and Yermack (2006)
find for a sample of 237 large capitalization firms that the level of the CEO’s pension benefits is
positively associated with the firm’s distance from default on its credit obligations. This leads to
the following two hypotheses.
H2B: Pensions are positively associated with leverage.
H2C: Pensions are positively associated with higher quality credit ratings.
Baber et al. (1996) find that firms with greater investment opportunities use higher levels
of equity based compensation and lower levels of accounting based compensation, such as
annual bonuses. The annual bonus is a major determinant of final pension benefits, implying
that firms with greater investment opportunities provide lower levels of pension benefits. In
addition, pensions are typically unfunded, thus introducing debt into the CEO’s contract, which
can limit the riskiness of the CEO’s investment decisions. This implies that firms with greater
investment opportunities provide their CEOs with lower levels of pension benefits, leading to
the following hypothesis.
H2D: Pensions are negatively associated with investment opportunities.
Another potential contracting benefit of pensions is tax planning (Scholes et al. 2002).
Pensions represent a tax efficient form of compensation in three situations: when the firm can
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earn a higher after tax rate of return than the CEO; when the CEO’s marginal tax rate decreases
during retirement; when the firm’s marginal tax rate increases after the CEO retires.
Although pensions can assist in joint tax planning, taxes do not appear to be a major
determinant of CEO pensions. First, CEO pensions are primarily non‐qualified and therefore do
not provide firms with immediate tax deductions. Second, unlike deferred compensation plans,
the firm’s after tax rate of return does not directly affect pension benefits. Third, the highest
marginal tax rate applies to income over $326,449, which is probably below the pre‐pension
retirement income of most S&P 500 CEOs. Finally, if taxes drive pension benefits, then there
should be introductions and terminations of pension plans related to changes in tax rates.
Empirical evidence, however, suggests that firms do not introduce pensions in anticipation of
increasing marginal tax rates.
Finally, there is an extensive labor economics literature on worker pensions (for a survey
see McGill 2004). This literature primarily focuses on determinants such as retention, risk
sharing, and retirement planning. Retention does not appear to be a major pension determinant
for CEOs because they typically hold other long term incentives that are subject to vesting such
as stock options. Risk sharing and retirement planning also do not appear to be major pension
determinants because CEOs are typically wealthy individuals with access to outside financial
planners and services.
3.3. Excess Compensation
Ultimately, the Managerial Power View rests on the assumption that pensions allow
CEOs to earn excess compensation through rent extraction. Even if disclosures lead to biased
estimates of pension values, and pension benefit levels are higher than expected, these facts
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have little impact on shareholders if they do not lead to excessive total compensation. In
addition, the labor economics literature finds evidence that pensions can complement and
substitute for other forms of compensation, implying that pensions should not be investigated
in isolation (McGill 2004).
To the extent that the Managerial Power View is descriptive, pensions should be
associated with excess compensation, leading to the following hypothesis.
H3: Pension benefits are positively associated with excess compensation.

4. Samples and Research Design
4.1. Samples
I use two samples in the empirical analyses. The first sample consists of a proprietary
data set of 172 publicly traded firms. A major compensation consultant surveyed these firms
about the retirement benefits they provide to their top executives. The data are from fiscal 2003
and include pension plan information that firms are not required to disclose. Table 1 provides
descriptive statistics for this proprietary sample. In untabulated analyses, I find that responding
firms are similar in size to firms on the S&P 500 Index (of which two‐thirds of this sample are
members), but tend to have fewer investment opportunities.
The second sample consists of firms in the S&P 500 Index for either fiscal 2004, fiscal
2005, or both. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for this sample.
4.2. Pension Valuations
I calculate the value of two life annuities for firms in the proprietary sample. For all
firms in this sample, I calculate the first annuity based on actual plan details. For the firms that
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provide lump sum payouts but do not disclose, I calculate the second life annuity based on
public disclosures. To value the second annuity, I follow Sundaram and Yermack’s (2006)
methodology and use the firm’s cost of debt and the Social Security Life Expectancy Table. To
proxy for the cost of debt, I use the ten year corporate bond rate associated with the firm’s S&P
Long Term Debt Rating. Consistent with Sundaram and Yermack (2006), unrated firms are
assumed to have a AAA rating. I assume that CEOs retire at the age specified by the plan. CEOs
who are older than the plan specified age are assumed to retire at fiscal year end.
To value pension benefits for the S&P 500 sample, I estimate the CEO’s annual
retirement payment from the firm’s proxy statements for fiscal 2004 and 2005. I calculate the
value of four life annuities using two retirement age assumptions (62 and 65) and two mortality
table assumptions (the Social Security Administration Life Expectancy Table and the 1983
General Annuitants’ Mortality Table [“1983 GAM”])5. I use the mean of the four estimates in the
empirical tests to reduce noise. CEOs who are older than the retirement ages are assumed to
retire at fiscal year end. To proxy for the cost of debt, I use the ten year corporate bond rate
associated with the firm’s S&P Long Term Debt Rating. Consistent with Sundaram and
Yermack (2006), unrated firms are assumed to have a AAA rating. I discount the annuity to
fiscal year end using the cost of debt proxy. The annual accrual of pension benefits is the
difference between the present values of accrued pension benefits as of fiscal year ends 2004
and 2005.
4.3. Asset Substitution Problem

5

The 1983 GAM is the most common mortality table used by firms in the proprietary sample.
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I create two measures meant to estimate asset substitution problems. First, incentives for
CEOs and shareholders to increase firm risk at the expense of creditors are assumed to be
positively correlated with the firm’s leverage ratio (Gavish and Kalay 1983; Green and Talmor
1986). To measure leverage ratios, I calculate LEVERAGE, which is the ratio of short and long
term debt to the book value of total assets.
Second, I use the firm’s S&P Long Term Debt Rating to estimate default risk. I create
indicator variables for the various ratings (AAA/AA, A, BBB, and JUNK) to control for non‐
linearities in default probabilities. AAA and AA are combined because there are only eight
AAA firms in the S&P 500 for 2004 and six for 2005. I make two assumptions about the
association between the asset substitution problem and the firm’s default risk: firms with higher
default risk have greater incentives to engage in asset substitution; firms with lower default risk
take actions to minimize the potential for asset substitution and therefore benefit from lower
borrowing costs.
4.4. Investment Opportunities
To measure investment opportunities I create four variables. First, firms with greater
investment opportunities are assumed to have higher levels of uncertainty. To measure
uncertainty I create IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK, which is the residual from a market model regression
estimated over the 24 prior months. Second, investment opportunities are assumed to be
negatively associated with the ratio of the book value of assets to the market value of assets,
BOOK TO MARKET. Third, firms with greater investment opportunities are assumed to make
greater investments in research and development. R&D is the ratio of the research and
development expenditures to total assets. Finally, firms with greater investment opportunities
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are assumed to have lower levels of fixed investments. To measure the level of a firm’s fixed
investments, I create PP&E, which is the ratio of the net value of property, plant, and equipment
to total assets.
4.5. CEO Power
I create proxies to measure the following three dimensions of CEO power: anti‐takeover
charter amendments, institutional investor ownership, and board characteristics. CEOs of firms
with more anti‐takeover charter amendments are assumed to exercise greater power because
they are insulated from the discipline provided by the market for corporate control. Consistent
with this assumption, prior literature finds that CEOs of firms with more anti‐takeover charter
amendments have higher compensation and lower equity incentives (Borokhovich et al. 1997;
Fahlenbrach 2002). To measure protection from the market for corporate control, I use GINDEX,
which is the simple sum of the firm’s anti‐takeover protections (Gompers et al. 2003). This
variable is taken from the IRRC Governance database.
Prior literature finds that institutional investors influence CEO compensation and
turnover (Hartzell and Starks 2003; Parrino et al. 2003; Almazan et al. 2005). To measure the
level and quality of institutional investor influence, I use BLOCKHOLDERS, the number of
institutional investors holding 5% or more of the firm’s common shares outstanding.
Institutional ownership is taken from the CDA/Spectrum database of 13Fs.
The board of directors hires the CEO, provides direct monitoring of the CEO,
negotiates the CEO’s contract, and has authority to fire. Therefore, CEOs with more power over
the board have more leeway to influence firm disclosure policies, and dictate their
compensation and benefit packages.
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I use five proxies to measure the CEO’s power over the board. CHAIR is an indicator
variable coded as one if the CEO chairs the board, and zero otherwise. CEOs who are also chairs
are assumed to be relatively more powerful because they can set the board’s agenda
(Finkelstein and DʹAveni 1994). BOARD SIZE is the natural logarithm of the number of directors.
CEOs of firms with larger boards are assumed to have more power because of increased
coordination costs (Yermack 1996). INSIDE DIRECTORS is the percentage of insiders on the
board, with a higher percentage of insiders expected to increase CEO power because CEOs have
more influence over the careers of insiders (Byrd and Hickman 1992). DIRECTOR AGE is the
mean age of the board. Older directors are assumed to be less effective in monitoring, providing
the CEO with more power (Core et al. 1999). Finally, INTERLOCKS is the number of director
interlocks on the board, with interlocked directors assumed to be less effective monitors
because of reciprocal relations (Hallock 1997). I hand collect CHAIR from proxy statements and
take the remaining board variables from the IRRC Directors database.
One criticism of these proxies is that they do not fully capture the CEO’s power at the
initiation of the pension plan. This point does not take into account that boards can and do
renegotiate pension plans that are not trust protected. Another criticism of these proxies is that
they represent CEO quality and should therefore be positively associated with compensation
and benefit levels. Core et al. (1999) find, however that excess compensation determined by
similar measures is associated with operating and stock return underperformance, suggesting
that these proxies capture CEO power.
Both governance characteristics and CEO pensions cluster by industry (Larcker et al.
2005; Sundaram and Yermack 2006). I therefore industry adjust GINDEX, BLOCKHOLDERS, and
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all board related variables, except for CHAIR, to control for industry effects that are correlated
with governance. I subtract the industry means for the full populations of the IRRC and
CDA/Spectrum databases from each variable. Firms are classified into 15 industries following
Barth et al. (1998).
4.6. Control Variables
To control for proprietary costs of disclosure I calculate COMPETITION, which is the
Herfindahl‐Hirschman Index for the firm’s industry (six digit NAICS). The Index is estimated
on the entire Compustat population. Firms in more competitive industries are assumed to incur
greater costs from disclosing proprietary details of the CEO’s contract.
Firm performance can affect the level of pension benefits because pensions are partially
a function of salary plus bonus. To control for performance, I use two variables: ROA is the ratio
of net income to the book value of assets; RETURNS is the return on common equity for the prior
fiscal year.
Finally, two additional variables control for other factors that can affect pension benefits.
I create CEO AGE because pension benefits increase monotonically in age up to the plan’s
retirement age. In addition, to the extent that age is correlated with outside wealth, this variable
controls for the effect of outside wealth on the CEO’s compensation package. The final variable,
Ln(ASSETS), controls for size effects.

5. Results
I carry out five sets of empirical tests. The first set examines on a univariate basis
discretionary disclosures of pension plan characteristics, and biases in estimates of pension
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values based on public disclosures. The second set of tests examines the determinants of
pension benefits. In the third set of tests I investigate whether pensions are associated with
excess compensation. The fourth set examines the determinants of the provision and disclosure
of pension plan details. The final set of tests investigates the determinants of bias in estimates of
pension values based on public disclosures.
5.1. Plan Characteristics and Disclosure
I first investigate the Managerial Power View argument that firms provide limited
disclosures of pension plan characteristics, and that these disclosures lead to downwardly
biased estimates of pension values.
Table 3 Panel A tabulates the provision and disclosure of lump sum payout options,
Rabbi Trusts, and Secular Trusts for the proprietary sample. I combine Rabbi and Secular trusts
into the class “Protection” because only three firms in the sample protect the CEO’s pension
with a Secular Trust.
Of the 172 firms in the proprietary sample, 99 (58%) allow the CEO to take a lump sum
payout at retirement. Of these 99 firms, 38 (38% of the firms that provide lump sum payouts)
disclose in their proxy statements that they provide lump sum payouts. Of the 38 firms that do
disclose, only one firm discloses the relevant discount rate. No firm discloses the relevant
mortality table. Discretionary disclosure extends to protections. Of the 62 (36% of the
proprietary sample) firms that provide their CEO with either a Rabbi or a Secular trust, only six
firms (10% of the firms that protect) disclose this provision.
For the 61 firms in the proprietary sample that provide but do not disclose lump sum
payouts, Table 3 Panel B presents descriptive statistics of the differences between pension
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valuations based on public disclosures and valuations based on actual plan data. Differences are
defined as bias, with negative differences representing downward bias in estimates based on
public disclosures.6
For this sub‐sample, estimates based on public disclosures are on average downwardly
biased, but the biases are relatively small. Although the minimum is ‐$3.462 million (‐29.32% of
actual benefits), the mean is ‐$593.96 thousand (‐7.50%), which is less than the sub‐sample’s
mean annual salary of $1.0 million.7 Moreover, some firms pursue disclosure policies that lead
to overestimates of pension benefits—the maximum difference is $4.182 million (37.98%).
In summary, I find that some firms’ disclosure policies do not provide complete
information about the CEO’s pension plan, and that these disclosure policies are associated with
downwardly biased estimates of pension benefits. My results, however, do not support the
hypothesis that estimates of pension values based on public disclosures are downwardly
biased—relative to annual salary, bias is economically insignificant. In addition, the evidence
suggests that the new SEC disclosure requirements are likely to have little impact on investors’
ability to value pensions.
5.2. Pension Benefit Levels
I next examine the determinants of pension benefit levels. Given the small differences
between public and proprietary pension valuations found in the preceding analyses, I assume
that public disclosures are adequate to estimate pension benefits. This assumption allows me to
increase the sample size and consequently the power of empirical tests.
Note that bias represents an underestimate of the present value of accrued pension benefits as opposed
to the annual accrual of pension benefits.
7 Biases are primarily driven by differences between the plan’s discount rate and the firm’s cost of debt.
Mean bias based solely on differences in discount rates is ‐$435 thousand (‐7.50%).
6
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Table 4 presents analyses of pension benefit levels for S&P 500 CEOs in fiscal 2004 and
2005. Panel A presents estimates of the present value of their accrued pension benefits. The
mean of their accrued pension benefits is $3.3 million for 2004 and $4.3 million for 2005.8 Some
CEOs hold relatively large pension benefits—the 99th percentiles are $23.6 million and $32.9
million for 2004 and 2005. Not all S&P 500 CEOs receive pension benefits—36% did not have
pension benefits in 2004 and 38% did not in 2005. In untabulated analyses, I find that the mean
of accrued benefits (conditional on receiving pensions) is $5.2 million in 2004 and $7.0 million in
2005.
Table 4 Panel B presents multivariate analyses of pension determinants. I estimate Tobit
models to account for CEOs who do not receive pension benefits. Tobit assumes that the
determinants of pension provision are the same as the determinants of pension level,
conditional on provision. Unreported log likelihood tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of
the same determinants (Lin and Schmidt 1984). I therefore present Probit models for the
determinants of provision and Truncated Regression models for the level, conditional on
provision. Tobit results are presented for comparison.
The dependent variable for the Tobit and Truncated Regression models is the natural
logarithm of accrued benefits plus one. I use the natural logarithm because the distribution of
pension benefits is skewed. The dependent variable in the Probit models is an indicator variable
set equal to one if the CEO receives pension benefits, and zero otherwise.

These estimates are similar in magnitude to prior research. Sundaram and Yermack (2006) find for a
smaller sample of 237 CEOs of large capitalization firms that the mean present value of accrued pension
benefits is $4.5 million.

8
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First, I estimate the following specification to determine the ability of controls and
contracting determinants to explain cross‐sectional variation in pension benefit levels:
PENSIONit = α + β1Ln(ASSETS)it + β2CEO AGEit + β3BOOK TO MARKETit + β4R&Dit + β5PP&Eit
+ β6IDIOSYNCRATIC RISKit + β7LEVERAGEit + β8AAA/AAit + β9Ait + β10BBBit
+ β11JUNKit + εit
Using only the controls and contracting determinants, all three models have significant
explanatory power—the Pseudo R2s for Tobit, Probit, and Truncated Regression are 0.25, 0.18,
and 0.43.9 In addition, Probit correctly classifies 75.51% of the observations using only the
controls and contracting determinants.
The results for Tobit and Probit are similar. In both models, BOOK TO MARKET and
PP&E are positive and significant, and IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK is negative and significant. These
results are consistent with the hypothesis that pensions are negatively associated with
investment opportunities.
For the asset substitution measures, I find that firms with higher quality debt ratings are
more likely to provide pension benefits. Firms with AAA, AA, or A debt ratings are 24% more
likely to provide their CEOs with a pension. Although the coefficients on LEVERAGE, BBB, and
JUNK are positive as predicted, they are not significant at the 0.10 level. These findings suggest
either that firms with higher quality debt ratings provide pensions to mitigate asset substitution
problems, or that CEOs of firms with higher quality debt ratings are more likely to accept
(potentially risky) pension benefits.

I calculate Pseudo R2s for Tobit and Truncated Regression as the square of the Pearson correlation
between the predicted value and the dependent variable (Wooldridge 2002). I report McFadden R2s for
Probit.
9
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In Truncated Regression, Ln(ASSETS) and CEO AGE are positive and significant. The
coefficient on Ln(ASSETS) is 0.34, which is similar in magnitude to the size elasticities of other
forms of compensation (Murphy 1999). In contrast to Tobit and Probit, I find conflicting results
for the hypothesis that pensions are negatively associated with investment opportunities. BOOK
TO MARKET is negative and significant, implying that, conditional on provision, pension
benefits are positively associated with investment opportunities. In contrast to the prior results
but consistent with the Probit and Tobit results, PP&E is positive and significant, implying that,
conditional on provision, pension benefits are negatively associated with investment
opportunities.
Inconsistent with Tobit and Probit, none of the asset substitution measures are
associated with the level of pension benefits, conditional on their provision. These findings
imply that although asset substitution is associated with the existence of a pension, size and
growth opportunities determine the level of pension benefits.
Next, I estimate the following specification to determine the ability of CEO power
measures to explain cross‐sectional variation in pension benefits holding firm‐level economic
factors constant:
PENSIONit = α + β1Ln(ASSETS)it + β2CEO AGEit + β3BOOK TO MARKETit + β4R&Dit + β5PP&Eit
+ β6IDIOSYNCRATIC RISKit + β7LEVERAGEit + β8AAA/AAit + β9Ait + β10BBBit
+ β11JUNKit + β12GINDEXit +β13BLOCKHOLDERSit + β14CHAIRit + β15BOARD SIZEit
+ β16INSIDE DIRECTORSit + β17DIRECTOR AGEit + β18INTERLOCKSit + εit
With the introduction of the CEO power measures, all three Pseudo R2s increase: 0.33 for
Tobit; 0.25 for Probit; 0.45 for Truncated Regression. F tests of these changes are significant at
the 0.01 level for all three models. Although the Pseudo R2s increase, the Probit correct
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classification rate increases by only 1.08% to 76.59%. Furthermore, in all three models the
coefficients on the controls, investment opportunity measures, and asset substitution measures
maintain their signs and significance except for R&D, which is now negative and significant in
Truncated Regression.
Consistent with the hypothesis that CEO power determines pension benefits, CHAIR is
positive and significant in all models, and BOARD SIZE is positive and significant in Tobit and
Probit. Inconsistent with the Managerial Power View, INSIDE DIRECTORS is always negative
and significant. This finding is similar to the results of Core et al. (1999), and suggests that
inside directors can provide higher quality monitoring than outside directors.
Tobit, Probit, and Truncated Regression measure mean effects. To investigate the extent
of power for CEOs with high levels of pension benefits, I examine firms in the 95th percentile of
pension benefits for 2004. Table 4 Panel C compares means of CEO power measures for firms in
the 95th percentile to the entire S&P 500 and to firms in the S&P 500 that provide pension
benefits. I exclude firms in the 95th percentile from both comparison groups.
Consistent with the Managerial Power View, firms in the 95th percentile have fewer
blockholders, are more likely to combine the CEO and chair positions, and have older directors.
Inconsistent with the Managerial Power View, firms in the 95th percentile have fewer inside
directors compared to the full S&P 500 Index.
Overall, my findings suggest that firm‐level economic characteristics and contracting
determinants primarily determine the level of pension benefits, but that CEO power measures
provide additional explanatory power. Although this additional explanatory power is
statistically significant, CEO power measures provide only a modest increase of 1.08% in the
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ability of a Probit model to predict which CEOs receive pension benefits. With respect to
regression coefficients, pension benefits are positively associated with some measures of CEO
power but, inconsistent with the Managerial Power View, pension benefits are negatively
associated with inside directors.
5.3. Pension Benefits and Excess Compensation
I now investigate the Managerial Power View argument that pensions are associated
with total excess compensation. Table 5 presents two OLS models that investigate the
association between the annual pension accrual and excess compensation for S&P 500 CEOs in
fiscal 2005.
To measure excess compensation, I estimate a first stage regression of the level of total
non‐pension compensation on contracting determinants and CEO power measures.
TOTAL COMPENSATIONit = α + β1Ln(ASSETS)it + β2BOOK TO MARKETit + β3CEO AGEit
+ β4RETURNSit + β5ROAit + β6VOLATILITYit + β7SD ROAit
+ β8GINDEXit + β9BLOCKHOLDERSit + β10CHAIRit
+ β11BOARD SIZEit + β12INSIDE DIRECTORSit + β13DIRECTOR AGEit
+ β14INTERLOCKSit + εit
I then calculate EXCESS COMPENSATION as the linear combination of the estimated CEO
power coefficients from the first stage regression and the CEO Power measures.
EXCESS COMPENSATIONit = β8GINDEXit + β9BLOCKHOLDERSit + β10CHAIRit + β11BOARD SIZEit
+ β12INSIDE DIRECTORSit + β13DIRECTOR AGEit + β14INTERLOCKSit
The first model presented in Table 5 includes controls and contracting determinants, and
the second model includes controls, contracting determinants, and CEO power measures. I
include CEO power measures in the second model to investigate whether power is associated
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with pension benefits after controlling for excess compensation.10 The dependent variable in
both models is the annual accrual of pension benefits.
PENSION ACCRUALit = α + β1Ln(ASSETS)it + β2CEO AGEit + β3RETURNSit + β4ROAit
+ β5BOOK TO MARKETit + β6R&Dit + β7PP&Eit + β8IDIOSYNCRATIC RISKit
+ β9LEVERAGEit + β10AAA/AAit + β11Ait + β12BBBit + β13JUNKit
+ β14EXCESS COMPENSATIONit + ειt
PENSION ACCRUALit = α + β1Ln(ASSETS)it + β2CEO AGEit + β3RETURNSit + β4ROAit
+ β5BOOK TO MARKETit + β6R&Dit + β7PP&Eit + β8IDIOSYNCRATIC RISKit
+ β9LEVERAGEit + β10AAA/AAit + β11Ait + β12BBBit + β13JUNKit
+ β14GINDEXit +β15BLOCKHOLDERSit + β16BOARD SIZEit
+ β17INSIDE DIRECTORSit + β18DIRECTOR AGEit + β19INTERLOCKSit
+ β20EXCESS COMPENSATIONit + εit
Both models provide significant explanatory power. The Adjusted R2s are 0.22 and 0.24.
Ln(ASSETS) and PP&E are positive and significant in both models, implying that the annual
pension accrual increases in firm size and fixed investments. CEO AGE is also positive and
significant in both models, implying that the annual pension accrual increases in CEO age. In
the second model, RETURNS is positive and significant, suggesting that the annual pension
accrual increases with firm performance. LEVERAGE is negative and significant in both models.
This suggests either that CEOs of highly levered firms are less likely to accept pension benefits,
or pension benefits constrain CEOs from increasing firm leverage. Consistent with Table 4 Panel
B, AAA/AA is positive and significant, implying that CEOs of firms with high quality debt ratings
receive higher annual pension accruals.
EXCESS COMPENSATION is positive and significant in both models. One dollar of excess
compensation is associated with between $0.16–0.23 of accrued pension benefits. In the second
model, BOARD SIZE is positive and significant and INSIDE DIRECTORS is negative and

I do not include CHAIR in the second model because it is highly correlated (0.75)with EXCESS
COMPENSATION.
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significant, implying that, controlling for excess compensation, CEO power provides additional
explanatory power for the annual pension accrual.
Results of this section support the Managerial Power View argument that pensions are
associated with excess compensation—$1.00 of excess compensation is associated with a $0.16–
0.23 increase in the present value of accrued pension benefits. This rate, however, implies that a
significant amount of rent extraction is in the form of compensation that is subject to higher
levels of disclosure than pensions. For example, on average a $1.00 increase in excess non‐
pension compensation is associated with an approximate $0.01 increase in the annual retirement
payment provided by a pension.11
5.4. Determinants of Plan Disclosures
I now investigate the Managerial Power View argument that firms use limited
disclosure to hide and/or camouflage relevant pension plan characteristics. Table 6 presents two
Logistic regressions that investigate the disclosure of lump sum payout options and plan
protections (Rabbi or Secular trust). These regressions are estimated on firms in the proprietary
sample that provide lump sum payout options and plan protections. The regressions use the
following specification:
DISCLOSEit = α + β1GINDEXit + β2BLOCKHOLDERSit + β3CHAIRit + β4BOARD SIZEit
+ β5INSIDE DIRECTORSit + β6DIRECTOR AGEit + β7INTERLOCKSit
+ β8EXCESS PENSIONit + β9COMPETITIONit + εit
The dependent variable for disclosure of lump sum payouts is an indicator variable for
whether the firm discloses the lump sum payout option in its proxy statement, conditional on
provision. The independent variables are measures of excess pension benefits, industry

11

This example assumes a life perpetuity with a 5% discount rate.
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competition, and CEO power. I include a measure of industry competition to control for
proprietary costs of disclosure, and I also include CEO power measures to investigate whether
power is associated with disclosure policies. A measure of excess pension benefits is included to
investigate whether disclosure policies are used to hide and/or camouflage excess pension
benefits. I estimate excess pension benefits as the residuals from a benchmark model based on
the specifications used in Table 4 Panel B. The benchmark model is estimated on the entire
proprietary sample and includes firm controls, asset substitution measures, investment
opportunity measures, and CEO power measures.
The dependent variable for protection disclosure is an indicator variable for whether the
firm discloses in its proxy statement that it protects the CEO’s pension, conditional on
protecting the plan. The independent variables are measures of excess pension benefits,
industry competition, and CEO power. I include a measure of excess pension benefits to
investigate whether excess pension benefits are associated with less disclosure. A measure of
industry competition is included to control for proprietary costs of disclosure, and CEO power
measures are included to investigate whether power is associated with disclosure policies.
Although correct classification rates range from 63.12% to 90.70%, none of the
regressions are significant at the 0.05 level. In addition, none of the coefficients are significant at
the 0.10 level.
Overall, I find that although firms exercise discretion in the disclosure of lump sum
payouts and protections, disclosure policies are not associated with excess pension benefits,
CEO power measures, and/or industry competition. The evidence provides no support for the
Managerial Power View argument that firms use disclosure policies to hide and/or camouflage

30
relevant pension plan characteristics and excess pension benefits. Finally, in untabulated
analyses I find no evidence that the provisions of lump sum payouts and plan protections are
associated with CEO power and/or excess pension benefits.
5.5. Determinants of Bias
Although I find in Section 5.1 that bias is on average economically insignificant, bias
may vary systematically with excess pension benefits and/or CEO power. To investigate this
possibility, Table 7 presents two OLS models estimated on firms in the proprietary sample that
provide but do not disclose lump sum payouts.
The dependent variable in the first regression is the dollar value of the bias in pension
estimates based on public disclosures and in the second regression it is the percentage of bias.
The independent variables include measures of excess pension benefits, industry competition,
and CEO power. The excess pension measure is the same as that used in section 5.4. I include a
measure of industry competition to control for proprietary costs of disclosure. Ln(ASSETS) and
CEO AGE are also included to control for size and age effects. The specification for both
regressions is as follows:
BIASit = α + β1Ln(ASSETS)it + β2CEO AGEit + β3GINDEXit + β4BLOCKHOLDERSit + β5CHAIRit
+ β6BOARD SIZEit + β7INSIDE DIRECTORSit + β8DIRECTOR AGEit + β9INTERLOCKSit
+ β10COMPETITIONit + εit
The small sample size of 50 observations limits the power of the two regressions.12 The
Adjusted R2s and p values are 0.13 and 0.12 for the dollar bias, and ‐0.02 and 0.59 for percent
bias.

The sample size is less than the 61 firms presented in Table 3 Panel B because governance variables are
missing for nine firms. In addition, I remove two observations with extreme DFFITS (Belsley et al. 1980).
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As predicted by the Managerial Power View, the coefficient on EXCESS PENSION in
both OLS regressions is negative, but not significant. As predicted by the discretionary
disclosure literature, the coefficient on COMPETITION is positive in both regressions, but also
not significant. Bias using either regression is associated with CEO power, but in a direction
opposite to that predicted by the Managerial Power View. The coefficients on INSIDE
DIRECTORS are positive and significant, implying that a 1.00% increase in inside directors
above the industry mean is associated with a $42.8 thousand overestimate of pension benefits.
This result is consistent with Singh (2006), who shows analytically that in the presence of
director career concerns captured boards are less likely to lower the level of disclosed pay.
OLS measures mean effects. To investigate effects for CEOs with extreme downward
bias, I compare, in untabulated univariate analyses, firms in the quartile of highest downward
bias to the firms in the remaining quartiles. The only difference between the two groups is that
firms in the highest quartile of downward bias have fewer inside directors.
Overall, my results provide no support for the hypothesis that disclosure is used to hide
and/or camouflage excess pension benefits— neither discretionary disclosure nor bias is
associated with excess pension benefits. Bias is associated with CEO power but in a direction
opposite to that predicted by the Managerial Power View—inside directors are associated with
disclosure policies that lead to upwardly biased estimates of pension benefits.

6. Summary and Conclusion
I investigate the extent to which the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Views
of pensions are descriptive of CEO pensions. Specifically, I investigate the extent to which
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discretionary disclosures are associated with excess pension benefits, and the relation between
pensions and CEO power and/or contracting determinants. I also examine whether pensions are
associated with excess total compensation.
My results provide some support for both the Managerial Power and Optimal
Contracting Views. Economic contracting variables, however, appear to explain the cross‐
sectional variation in pension benefit levels to a greater extent than CEO power measures.
Although pension benefit levels are associated with CEO power measures, the direction of
coefficients is often opposite to that predicted by the Managerial Power View. Finally, neither
CEO power measures nor excess pension benefits are associated with discretionary pension
disclosures.
Overall, this evidence suggests that pensions may be used for rent extraction in some
cases, but the practice appears to be limited. In addition, my disclosure results suggest that rent
extraction can be detected using public disclosures, implying that recent SEC changes in
pension disclosure requirements are likely to have little effect on investors’ ability to value
pensions.
The results of this study must be interpreted in light of endogeneity. Disclosures,
pensions, compensation, and equity incentives represent choices of both the CEO and the board
of directors. In addition, empirical proxies used in this study are undoubtedly measured with
error. Therefore, estimates can suffer from endogeneity biases that affect inferences.
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Appendix A
Prior SEC Disclosure Requirements
1. (f) Defined Benefit or Actuarial Plan Disclosure.
(1) Pension Plan Table.
(i) For any defined benefit or actuarial plan under which benefits are determined
primarily by final compensation (or average final compensation) and years of service,
provide a separate Pension Plan Table showing estimated annual benefits payable upon
retirement (including amounts attributable to any defined benefit supplementary or
excess pension award plans) in specified compensation and years of service
classifications in the format specified below

PENSION PLAN TABLE

Remuneration
125,000
150,000
175,000
200,000
225,000
250,000
300,000
400,000
450,000
500,000

15

Years of Service
20
25
30

35

(ii) Immediately following the Table, the registrant shall disclose:
(A) The compensation covered by the plan(s), including the relationship of such covered
compensation to the annual compensation reported in the Summary Compensation
Table required by paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of this item, and state the current compensation
covered by the plan for any named executive officer
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Appendix A (continued)
Prior SEC Disclosure Requirements
whose covered compensation differs substantially (by more than 10%) from that set
forth in the annual compensation columns of the Summary Compensation Table;
(B) The estimated credited years of service for each of the named executive officers; and
(C) A statement as to the basis upon which benefits are computed (e.g., straight‐life
annuity amounts), and whether or not the benefits listed in the Pension Plan Table are
subject to any deduction for Social Security or other offset amounts.
(2) Alternative Pension Plan Disclosure. For any defined benefit or actuarial plan under
which benefits are not determined primarily by final compensation (or average final
compensation) and years of service, the registrant shall state in narrative form:
(i) The formula by which benefits are determined; and
(ii) The estimated annual benefits payable upon retirement at normal retirement age for
each of the named executive officers.
Instructions to Item 402(f).
1. Pension Levels. Compensation set forth in the Pension Plan Table pursuant to
paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this item shall allow for reasonable increases in existing
compensation levels; alternatively, registrants may present as the highest
compensation level in the Pension Plan Table an amount equal to 120% of the
amount of covered compensation of the most highly compensated individual
named in the Summary Compensation Table required by paragraph (b)(2) of this
item.
2. Normal Retirement Age. The term ʺnormal retirement ageʺ means normal
retirement age as defined in a pension or similar plan or, if not defined therein,
the earliest time at which a participant may retire without any benefit reduction
due to age.
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Appendix B
New SEC Disclosure Requirements
The following changes will be required for the Summary Compensation Table:
A column reporting the annual change in the actuarial present value of
accumulated pension benefits and above‐market or preferential earnings on
nonqualified deferred compensation, so that these amounts can be deducted
from total compensation for purposes of determining the named executive
officers;
The following changes will be required for the Retirement Plan section:
The Pension Benefits Table, which will require disclosure of the actuarial present
value of each named executive officerʹs accumulated benefit under each pension
plan, computed using the same assumptions (except for the normal retirement
age) and measurement period as used for financial reporting purposes under
generally accepted accounting principles;
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for the Proprietary Sample
Mean

Std. Dev.

Q1

Median

Q3

CEO AGE
Ln(ASSETS)
COMPETITION

57.21
9.30
0.30

6.09
1.59
0.27

53.00
8.11
0.09

58.00
9.34
0.24

61.00
10.32
0.44

Investment Opportunities:
BOOK TO MARKET
R&D
PP&E
IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK

0.71
0.02
0.28
-1.28

0.21
0.04
0.22
0.38

0.58
0.00
0.12
-1.54

0.74
0.00
0.24
-1.35

0.89
0.02
0.41
-1.05

0.29
0.02
0.35
0.37
0.14

0.17
0.13
0.48
0.48
0.35

0.19
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.27
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.38
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.00

10.23
1.89
0.81
2.38
0.23
59.99
0.08

2.43
1.48
0.39
0.24
0.12
2.44
0.29

9.00
1.00
1.00
2.20
0.13
58.23
0.00

10.00
2.00
1.00
2.40
0.20
60.10
0.00

12.00
3.00
1.00
2.48
0.29
61.86
0.00

Asset Substitution:
LEVERAGE
AAA/AA
A
BBB
JUNK
CEO Power:
GINDEX
BLOCKHOLDERS
CHAIR
BOARD SIZE
INSIDE DIRECTORS
DIRECTOR AGE
INTERLOCKS
N

172

This table presents descriptive statistics for the proprietary sample. I measure all variables as of fiscal
year end 2003. CEO AGE is the CEO’s age as of fiscal year end. Ln(ASSETS) is the natural logarithm of
total assets (DATA6). BOOK TO MARKET is the ratio of the book value of assets to the market value of
assets (DATA6/(DATA199*DATA25+DATA181)). R&D is the ratio of research and development
expenditures to total assets (DATA46/DATA6). PP&E is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to
total assets (DATA8/DATA6). IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK is the log of the standard deviation of the residuals
from a market model estimated over the preceding 24 months. COMPETITION is the HerfindahlHirschman Index for the firm’s industry (six digit NAICS). LEVERAGE is the ratio of long and short term
debt to the book value of total assets ((DATA9+DATA34)/DATA6). AAA/AA, A, BBB, and JUNK are
indicator variables for the firm’s S&P Long Term Debt Rating (SPDRC). GINDEX is the firm’s G Score,
which is the simple sum of the firm’s anti-takeover protections (Gompers et al. 2003). BLOCKHOLDERS
is the number of institutional investors that hold 5% or more of the firm’s common shares outstanding.
CHAIR is an indicator for whether the CEO chairs the board. BOARD SIZE is the natural logarithm of the
number of directors on the board. INSIDE DIRECTORS is the percent of directors who are insiders.
DIRECTOR AGE is the mean director age. INTERLOCKS is the number of director interlocks.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for the S&P 500 Sample
Mean

Std. Dev.

Q1

Median

Q3

CEO AGE
Ln(ASSETS)
RETURNS
ROA

55.67
9.43
0.17
0.06

6.90
1.40
0.33
0.07

51.00
8.35
-0.01
0.02

56.00
9.28
0.12
0.05

60.00
10.29
0.29
0.10

Investment Opportunities:
BOOK TO MARKET
R&D
PP&E
IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK

0.61
0.02
0.24
-1.48

0.23
0.04
0.22
0.41

0.42
0.00
0.07
-1.78

0.62
0.00
0.17
-1.52

0.82
0.03
0.37
-1.24

0.23
0.08
0.33
0.35
0.03

0.17
0.27
0.47
0.48
0.18

0.11
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.21
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.31
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.00

9.73
1.72
0.65
2.35
0.28
59.79
0.06

2.50
1.37
0.48
0.26
0.15
3.11
0.27

8.00
1.00
0.00
2.20
0.17
57.89
0.00

10.00
2.00
1.00
2.40
0.25
59.83
0.00

11.00
3.00
1.00
2.48
0.38
61.82
0.00

Asset Substitution:
LEVERAGE
AAA/AA
A
BBB
JUNK
CEO Power:
GINDEX
BLOCKHOLDERS
CHAIR
BOARD SIZE
INSIDE DIRECTORS
DIRECTOR AGE
INTERLOCKS

This table presents descriptive statistics for the S&P 500 sample, which includes firms that are in the
Index for fiscal 2004 and/or 2005. RETURNS is the annual stock return. ROA is the return on assets
(DATA18/DATA6). Table 1 provides definitions of the remaining variables.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Disclosure and Bias
Panel A: Lump Sum Payouts and Protections
Lump Sum
Provide
Disclose

Protection
Provide
Disclose

Number of Firms
Percentage of Firms (%)

99
58

38
38

62
36

6
10

N

172

99

172

62

Panel B: Bias
Bias
$ in 000s
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Q1
Median
Q3
Maximum
N

%

-593.96
1,307.09

-7.50
13.60

-3,461.53
-1,315.62
-490.57
-156.87
4,181.76

-29.32
-18.66
-8.53
-2.14
37.98

61

61

This table presents the disclosure of plan options and bias in estimates of pension benefits based on
public disclosures for the proprietary sample. Panel A presents tabulations of how many firms provide
lump sum payouts and protections (Rabbi and Secular trusts) and, conditional on provision, how many
firms disclose in proxy statements. Panel B presents the distribution of bias. For firms that provide lump
sum payouts but do not disclose in public filings, I calculate bias as the difference between an estimate
based on public disclosures and the value of pension benefits based on actual plan details. The top of the
table presents the distribution of bias as both the dollar difference and the dollar difference deflated by the
actual plan value. Negative values represent the extent to which estimates based on public disclosures
are downwardly biased.
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Table 4
Analyses of Pension Benefit Levels
Panel A: Distribution of Pension Benefits ($ in 000s)
N
Fiscal Year End 2004
Fiscal Year End 2005

520
490

Mean

Std. Dev.

Q1

Median
0.00
0.00

859.97
968.85

Q3
3,876.73
5,059.18

95th Pct.

99th Pct.

14,685.91
19,577.52

23,572.51
32,870.32

3,289.61
4,344.02

6,146.29
8,806.29

Tobit

Probit

Truncated

Tobit

Probit

Truncated

-0.02
0.00

0.34***
0.14***

-0.15
0.02

-0.04
-0.01

0.30***
0.12***

3.69***
-9.02
2.68**
-2.82***

0.45***
-0.31
0.24*
-0.28***

2.60
3.49***
2.56***
0.53
1.23

0.21
0.21**
0.19***
0.03
0.09

0.09
-0.03
2.32***
2.60**
-7.24***
0.13
0.50

0.01
-0.01
0.22***
0.26**
-0.65***
0.01
0.09

-0.03
0.00
0.46***
-0.01
-0.75*
0.01
-0.08

833
0.33

833
0.25
76.59

552
0.45

Panel B: Determinants of Pension Benefits
Pred. Sign
Ln(ASSETS)
CEO AGE

+
+

0.00
0.09**

Investment Opportunities:
BOOK TO MARKET
R&D
PP&E
IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK

+
+
-

3.76***
-4.84
3.44***
-3.49***

0.44***
0.05
0.31**
-0.34***

Asset Substitution:
LEVERAGE
AAA/AA
A
BBB
JUNK

+
+
+
+
+

2.22
4.15***
3.29***
1.26
1.92

0.14
0.24**
0.24***
0.08
0.13

CEO Power:
GINDEX
BLOCKHOLDERS
CHAIR
BOARD SIZE
INSIDE DIRECTORS
DIRECTOR AGE
INTERLOCKS

+
+
+
+
+
+

N
Pseudo R2
Correctly Classified (%)

833
0.25

833
0.18
75.51

***, **, * Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed test)

-1.25***
-3.77
0.68**
-0.02
0.19
0.04
0.00
-0.25
-0.47

552
0.43

-1.14***
-4.32*
0.66**
0.02
0.18
0.05
0.02
-0.28
-0.45
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Table 4 (continued)
Level of Pension Benefits
Panel C: 95th Percentile of Pension Benefits (Means for fiscal 2004)
95th
Percentile
GINDEX
BLOCKHOLDERS
CHAIR
BOARD SIZE
INSIDE DIRECTORS
DIRECTOR AGE
INTERLOCKS

0.62
-0.28
0.92
0.17
-0.08
1.64
0.02

Full
S&P 500
0.60
0.35**
0.64**
0.13
-0.02*
0.26**
0.01

Pension
S&P 500
0.98
0.29**
0.72**
0.16
-0.05
0.40**
0.02

***, **, * Significantly different from the 95th Percentile at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed test)

This table presents analyses of the level of pension benefits for S&P 500 CEOs in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. Panel A presents the distribution of
the present value of their accrued pension benefits. Panel B presents investigates the determinants of pension benefits. The dependent variable in
the Tobit and Truncated Regression models is the natural logarithm of one plus the present value of accrued pension benefits. The dependent
variable in the Probit model is a binary variable coded as one if the CEO receives pension benefits, and zero otherwise. I cluster standard errors in
all models at the CEO level to account for multiple observations on the same CEO. I report coefficients for the Tobit models, marginal probabilities
for the Probit models, and marginal effects for the Truncated Regression models. I calculate the Pseudo R2s for the Tobit and Truncated
Regression models as the square of the Pearson correlation between the dependent variable and predicted value. I report McFadden Pseudo R2s
for the Probit models. I industry adjust the following variables: GINDEX, BLOCKHOLDERS, BOARD SIZE, INSIDE DIRECTORS, DIRECTOR
AGE, and INTERLOCKS. Table 1 provides definitions of the independent variables. Panel C compares the 95th percentile of pension benefits for
fiscal 2004 to firms in the S&P 500 and to those firms in the S&P 500 that provide pension benefits. I report industry adjusted means for the CEO
power measures except for CHAIR.
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Table 5
Regressions of the Annual Accrual of Pension Benefits and Excess Compensation
Pred. Sign

OLS

INTERCEPT
Ln(ASSETS)
CEO AGE
RETURNS
ROA

+
+
+
+

-6,651.88***
330.97***
56.22***
476.92
1,948.41

-6,039.66***
266.20***
52.54***
655.23*
2,163.02

Investment Opportunities:
BOOK TO MARKET
R&D
PP&E
IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK

+
+
-

517.72
1,107.52
1,414.30***
-343.79

807.91
434.05
1,374.93***
-266.83

Asset Substitution:
LEVERAGE
AAA/AA
A
BBB
JUNK

+
+
+
+
+

-2,421.78***
1,417.13***
532.93
84.55
11.65

-2,158.97***
1,187.03**
313.63
-89.44
-200.37

CEO Power:
GINDEX
BLOCKHOLDERS
BOARD SIZE
INSIDE DIRECTORS
DIRECTOR AGE
INTERLOCKS

+
+
+
+
+

EXCESS COMPENSATION

+

N
Adj. R2

-6.96
-124.15
1,239.21**
-1,936.61**
-34.25
-108.67
0.16**
386
0.22

0.23**
386
0.24

***, **, * Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed test)

This table presents estimates of the association between pensions and excess compensation. The
explanatory variable EXCESS COMPENSATION is that portion of compensation that is associated with
measures of CEO Power. I estimate a first stage regression in which the dependent variable is total
compensation (excluding pension benefits) and the independent variables include contracting
determinants of compensation and CEO Power measures. I calculate EXCESS COMPENSATION as the
linear combination of the estimated coefficients from the first stage and the CEO Power measures:
)
EXCESS COMPENSATION i = ∑ δi CEO POWER MEASURESi

I industry adjust the following variables: GINDEX, BLOCKHOLDERS, BOARD SIZE, INSIDE
DIRECTORS, DIRECTOR AGE, and INTERLOCKS. I drop CHAIR because it is highly correlated (0.75)
with EXCESS COMPENSATION. Tables 1 and 2 provide definitions of the independent variables.
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Table 6
Regressions of Plan Disclosures
Pred. Sign
INTERCEPT
CEO Power:
GINDEX
BLOCKHOLDERS
CHAIR
BOARD SIZE
INSIDE DIRECTORS
DIRECTOR AGE
INTERLOCKS
EXCESS PENSION
COMPETITION
N
Pseudo R2
p Value
Correctly Classified (%)

Logit
Lump Sum
Protection
-2.44**

-1.38

+/+/+/+/+/+/+/-

0.16
0.09
1.17
-0.77
-1.86
0.06
0.56

0.44
0.10
-1.43
2.19
3.25
-0.29
1.17

+

0.05
1.14

0.00
-2.63

77
0.08
0.60
67.53

43
0.27
0.50
90.70

***, **, * Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed test)

This table presents analyses of the determinants Lump Sum payout and Protection (Rabbi and Secular
trusts) disclosures for the proprietary sample. The dependent variable for the Lump Sum logistic
regression is an indicator variable for whether conditional on providing a lump sum payout option the firm
discloses in its proxy statement. The dependent variable for the Protection logistic regression is an
indicator variable for whether conditional on protecting the plan the firm discloses in its proxy statement.
EXCESS PENSION is the residual from a pension benchmark model based on the specifications used in
Table 4. I include contracting determinants in the pension benchmark model and estimate the benchmark
model on the entire proprietary sample. I industry adjust the following variables: GINDEX,
BLOCKHOLDERS, BOARD SIZE, INSIDE DIRECTORS, DIRECTOR AGE, and INTERLOCKS. Table 1
provides definitions of the remaining variables.

46
Table 7
Regressions of Bias on CEO Power and Excess Pension Benefits
OLS
Pred. Sign
INTERCEPT
Ln(ASSETS)
CEO AGE
CEO Power:
GINDEX
BLOCKHOLDERS
CHAIR
INSIDE DIRECTORS
BOARD SIZE
DIRECTOR AGE
INTERLOCKS
EXCESS PENSION
COMPETITION
N
Adj. R2
p Value

$ in 000s

%

-1,182.42
-70.00
21.47

-0.325
0.010
0.002

+/+/+/+/+/+/+/-

-6.91
169.63
-136.28
4,279.68***
1,040.30
18.89
-251.97

0.001
0.002
0.008
0.388**
0.090
-0.001
0.001

+

-0.04
5.30

-0.015
0.066

50
0.13
0.12

50
-0.03
0.59

***, **, * Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed test)

This table presents analyses of the determinants of bias in estimates of pension benefits based on public
disclosures. The bottom of the table presents two OLS regressions that investigate the determinants of
bias. I drop two outliers with extreme DFFITS (Belsley et al. 1980). EXCESS PENSION is the residual
from a pension benchmark model based on the specifications used in Table 4. I include contracting
determinants and CEO power measures in the pension benchmark model and estimate it on the entire
proprietary sample. I industry adjust the following variables: GINDEX, BLOCKHOLDERS, BOARD SIZE,
INSIDE DIRECTORS, DIRECTOR AGE, and INTERLOCKS. Tables 1 and 2 provide definitions of the
independent variables.

